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Revolutionary Intelligence: The Expanding Intelligence Role of
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
Abstract
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a military and paramilitary organization
that is meant to defend the ideals of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. Since its
formation, the IRGC has grown in influence and its intelligence role has expanded. This
paper examines the role of the IRGC in Iran’s intelligence system through a comprehensive
analysis of the organization of the IRGC’s intelligence arm, along with its operations and
capabilities. In doing so, the scope, objectives, resources, customers, and sponsors of the
IRGC’s intelligence activities are also analyzed. Additionally, this paper explores how the
IRGC interacts with the government of Iran, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security
(MOIS), other key internal stakeholders, and foreign client organizations. A key focus of
this analysis is the evolution of the relationship between the IRGC and the MOIS and the
growing influence of the IRGC in Iran’s intelligence community over the last decade. The
paper concludes that the IRGC has now eclipsed the MOIS within Iran’s intelligence
community and is one of the most powerful institutions in Iranian politics today, using its
intelligence activities as its key means of maintaining power and influence within the
country.
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Introduction
Prior to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran’s primary intelligence apparatus
was an organization known as SAVAK, an acronym for Sazman-e Ettela’at va
Amniat-e Keshvar (National Security and Intelligence Organization). The
pre-revolutionary government of Iran, under the Shah Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi, had been installed with the help of the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency and the British, and had aligned with the West in the Cold War.
SAVAK was created with the assistance of the United States and Israel in the
interest of protecting the Western-friendly Shah’s regime from potential
communist threats, given Iran’s shared northern border with the Soviet
Union. SAVAK grew to be a military-dominated organization of expansive
scope, with “15,000 full-time agents and thousands of part-time informants.”1
SAVAK developed a reputation for brutality, but up until the 1979 Revolution,
it successfully suppressed dissenters to the Shah’s regime. SAVAK’s brutal
repression was an integral factor in the growing unpopularity of the Shah,
which culminated in the Islamic Revolution.
In 1979, an Islamic Revolution swept across the country, and a clerical regime
led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini took power. Shortly
thereafter, the new Islamic government set up a number of small intelligence
agencies with various mandates alongside an organization known as SAVAMA
(Sazman Ettela’at va Amniat Melli Iran), which inherited the prerevolutionary intelligence apparatus from SAVAK. However, SAVAMA was
more interested in finding and eliminating the Revolution’s opponents—at
home and abroad—than in collecting information. At this time, the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) provided most of its foreign intelligence
information. A few years after the revolution, the intelligence services were
consolidated under the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). MOIS
was and remains under the nominal control of the president of Iran, who is
elected by the people and is in charge of running the government
bureaucracy.
Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was established as
an independent security force—reporting directly to the Supreme Leader—to
preserve the ideals of the revolution and to serve as a counterbalance to the
regular military. The IRGC was created as a guarantor for the Islamic clerical
regime that took power in Iran after the 1979 Revolution. The very existence

Federal Research Division, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile,
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2012), 6.
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of the IRGC affords the organization special status, as it stands deliberately
separate from the country’s regular armed forces. The head of the IRGC
reports directly to the Supreme Leader, and under Iran’s constitution the
Supreme Leader alone reserves the right to undertake the “appointment,
dismissal, and acceptance of resignation of” the chief commander of the
IRGC.2
The IRGC was initially tasked with enforcing revolutionary mandates and
eliminating counterrevolutionaries. The IRGC eventually assumed an
intelligence role, a role which has since expanded greatly.3 After an
opposition movement coalesced in 2009 to protest fraudulent elections, the
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei, consolidated major
intelligence agencies across various organizations under an expanded IRGC
Intelligence Organization. The newly-empowered IRGC dismantled the
opposition movement and has maintained greater influence in Iran’s
intelligence system relative to MOIS ever since. Khamenei retains direct
control of the IRGC Intelligence Organization as a check on potentially
dissenting forces within the government. Meanwhile, the IRGC has grown
into a potent political force itself, using its intelligence capabilities to gain
control over the internet, telecommunications, and key economic sectors. As
a result, the IRGC is arguably the most powerful force in Iranian politics with
its own interests, which are, for the time being, mostly aligned with those of
the clerical regime and the Supreme Leader.

Literature Review
Research for this paper uncovered a dearth of academic literature on the
intelligence role of the IRGC, with most sources focusing on its military and
paramilitary operations. Of course, the IRGC’s intelligence activities have
historically been in support of its military and paramilitary activities, and they
are closely linked. But the recent expansion of the IRGC’s intelligence role
beyond its historic scope has not been adequately covered in academic
literature. Moreover, the IRGC is usually treated as a secondary
consideration in the exploration of broader topics of research, such as Iran’s
foreign policy and its nuclear program. Iran’s nominally principal intelligence
agency, the MOIS, has been covered—most thoroughly in the Library of
Congress’s Federal Research Division report entitled Iran’s Ministry of

Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Article 110, Foundation for Iranian Studies,
available at: http://fis-iran.org/en/resources/legaldoc/constitutionislamic.
3 Federal Research Division, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile, pp.
6-10.
2
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Intelligence and Security: A Profile, which serves as a valuable source of
background information on Iran’s overall intelligence apparatus for this
article. Similar in-depth, comprehensive, and current coverage of the IRGC’s
intelligence operations, however, remains lacking in the academic context.
Given that the IRGC has now supplanted MOIS as the most powerful
intelligence organization in Iran, it deserves a greater degree of academic
study.
While academic sources have been scarce, journalistic sources on this topic
have been relatively abundant. Major newspapers and news magazines have
taken the lead on providing analysis of recent developments. Due to the
geopolitical importance of Iran to the West, the Western news media has
made coverage of Iranian intelligence issues a priority. As the IRGC has
evolved rapidly over the past decade, news outlets have been better able to
keep up with the changes in the system, while academic journals have lagged
behind. While news outlets are excellent at providing great breadth of
coverage, they are unable to provide much depth—one notable exception is
Dexter Filkins’s detailed and excellent profile of the Quds Force and its
commander for The New Yorker, titled “The Shadow Commander.” This
exception notwithstanding, a more scholarly approach is required to address
this need. Even beyond Iran’s intelligence apparatus, the IRGC has grown
into arguably the most powerful institution in Iranian politics today, and its
intelligence activities are a key means of maintaining power and influence
within the country. The IRGC’s expanded stature necessitates additional
research into this essential topic.

Organization
The IRGC has historically been a martial organization, having spent its
formative developmental years combating Iraqi forces during the Iran-Iraq
War. Overall, the IRGC consists of an estimated 125,000 members across all
of its divisions.4 But in addition to its more traditional military forces, which
include the IRGC Land Forces, the IRGC Air Force, and the IRGC Naval
Forces, the IRGC houses Iran’s key unconventional warfare, covert
operations, and intelligence forces. These include the Quds Force, the Basij,
and the IRGC Intelligence Organization (formerly the IRGC Intelligence
Branch). This paper focuses on these non-military divisions, as they are

Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other
Intelligence and Paramilitary Forces (Rough Working Draft) (Washington, D.C.: Center
for Strategic and International Studies, August 16, 2007), 3-10, available at:
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070816_cordesman_report.pdf.
4
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responsible for conducting and coordinating the IRGC’s intelligence
operations.

The Basij
The Basij is a volunteer paramilitary reserve force and the largest security
organization in Iran by manpower. The Basij has about 90,000 active
personnel and can draw upon a combined active and reserve strength of up to
300,000. When fully mobilized, the Basij is capable of commanding nearly
1,000,000 men.5 Part of the Basij’s mission is to help generate popular
resistance against a potential U.S. invasion, with Basij battalions integrated
into the IRGC’s military forces. However, the main mission of the Basij is riot
control and internal security. The Basij serves as a non-sophisticated,
decentralized, popular force that can be mobilized across the country on short
notice. Basij volunteers were called upon to disperse and arrest protesters
after the 2009 Green Revolution, which they successfully did, destroying the
momentum of the opposition movement.6

The IRGC Intelligence Organization
Prior to 2009, the IRGC Intelligence Branch was the official intelligence arm
of the IRGC and had about 2,000 personnel. This division was responsible
for gathering and analyzing intelligence in the broader Muslim world and
targeting domestic opposition groups and individuals. The IRGC Intelligence
Branch was “a largely politicized force with a political mission,” whose
“conformity and loyalty to the regime are unquestionable.”7 Events in 2009,
known as the Green Revolution, however, led to a major expansion in the
scope and importance of the Intelligence Branch. Major protests erupted
after claims of fraud in the June election, in which Islamist hardliner
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (an IRGC veteran) was officially declared
to have won a second term against reformist Mir-Hossein Mousavi.
Khamenei and IRGC leaders became concerned that a united opposition
movement could threaten the legitimacy of the clerical regime. In the wake of
the post-election protests, Iran’s intelligence apparatus underwent its largest
reorganization since the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989. Ali
Khamenei expanded the IRGC Intelligence Branch to form a new intelligence

Cordesman, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, p. 10.
Marc Champion, “Revolutionary Guard Tightens Security Grip,” Wall Street Journal,
November 13, 2009, available at:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125797782460044139.
7 Cordesman, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, p. 13.
5
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and security division, the Intelligence Organization, within the IRGC that
would report directly to his personal office.
The new organization vastly expanded the existing IRGC Intelligence Branch
and comprises seven separate intelligence and security divisions, including
Khamenei’s personal intelligence office known as Department 101, the
Internal Security Directorate within MOIS, the Security Directorate of the
Basij paramilitary force, and other plainclothes and paramilitary police units.8
The IRGC Intelligence Organization also includes the newly created Cyber
Defense Command. Hojjatoleslam Hossein Taeb, a cleric who had been
acting commander of the Basij since 2008, was named the head of the IRGC
Intelligence Organization. Taeb, who has served in the IRGC since 1982, is an
ardent Khamenei loyalist. He had been a student of Khamenei during the
1979 revolution and he is a friend of Khamenei’s son.9
While it is evident that the reorganization was undertaken as an effort to
more effectively quell internal dissent from protesters and politicians alike in
the aftermath of the fraudulent elections, it is unclear where the decision
originated or how it was finalized. The creation of the IRGC Intelligence
Organization was not a standalone event. Simultaneously, the IRGC
conducted a secret purge within MOIS, removing hundreds of intelligence
agents and directors from their positions.10 This solidified the IRGC’s control
of Iran’s intelligence apparatus and weakened the government’s ability to
challenge the IRGC’s authority and to impede its activities in cracking down
on dissenters.
Khamenei and the clerical regime undoubtedly felt threatened by the protests
and the public challenges to their legitimacy, and the reorganization provided
greater protection for them. Khamenei suspected that key MOIS officials
sympathized with the opposition and would present a dangerous internal
threat. But arguably the even bigger beneficiary to this reorganization (and
purge) is the IRGC itself, which was able to assume much greater influence
and power once the dust settled. It is likely that Khamenei and IRGC leaders
acted in concert, as they found their interests to be aligned, as they so often

“Iran Exile Group Says Khamenei Tightens Intelligence Grip,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, November 12, 2009, available at:
http://www.rferl.org/content/Iran_Exile_Group_Khamenei_Tightens_Intelligence_G
rip/1876444.html.
9 “Iran’s new spymaster,” Iran Focus, June 20, 2010, available at:
http://www.iranfocus.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2081
5:irans-new-spymaster&catid=29:exclusive-reports&Itemid=121.
10 “Iran’s new spymaster,” Iran Focus.
8
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have been. Ultimately, the clerical regime was able to maintain its legitimacy
through a show of force, which was provided by the IRGC. In turn, the IRGC
reduced its oversight, removed rivals within MOIS from positions of power,
and took over key MOIS functions.
Tensions over intelligence matters between Khamenei and the government
have continued since the 2009 shake-up. In April 2011, Ahmadinejad had
removed the intelligence minister, Heydar Moslehi, from his cabinet, as was
his right as the elected head of the government. Only a month later, in May,
Ahmadinejad was forced to accept the MOIS head back into his cabinet after
Moslehi was publicly reinstated to his post by Khamenei. The move by
Khamenei was less about Moslehi’s value in intelligence and more about
publicly demonstrating of the limits of the government’s power in such
matters. Moslehi was far from a competent intelligence minister—he had a
history of inventing foreign plots, and he publicly denied the success of the
U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden, claiming to have evidence proving bin
Laden had long since died of illness.11 In effect, Khamenei strong-armed
Ahmadinejad into keeping an incompetent intelligence minister in his cabinet
as a check on his authority over intelligence matters. This development
further eroded the government’s oversight and control over the country’s
intelligence system, to the benefit of the IRGC.

The Quds Force
The third major intelligence organization within the IRGC is the Quds Force,
which is the most difficult to delineate. The Quds Force is primarily
responsible for all Iranian intelligence activities and covert operations
conducted abroad. However, the Quds Force often works very closely with
Iran’s other intelligence organizations, including MOIS, which can blur the
distinction in responsibilities.12 The size of the Quds Force is estimated to be
15,000 personnel13—though the true size is hidden even from the Iranian
Parliament14—located in bases both in and outside of Iran. In many of Iran’s
embassies abroad, the Quds Force has sections that are closed off to most of

Thomas Erdbrink, “Iran’s Ahmadinejad affirms Khamenei decision, tensions remain,”
The Washington Post, May 8, 2011, available at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/irans-ahmadinejad-affirmskhamenei-decision-tensions-remain/2011/05/08/AFpK82QG_story.html.
12 Federal Research Division, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile, 16.
13 Cordesman, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, 8.
14 Scott Shane, “Iranian Force, Focus of U.S., Still a Mystery,” New York Times, February
17, 2007, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/17/world/middleeast/17quds.html.
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the embassy staff. Members are selected for both competency and their
allegiance to the Islamic principles of the 1979 revolution. New recruits are
trained in Shiraz and Tehran before being sent for indoctrination at the
Jerusalem Operation College in Qom.15
The Quds Force is divided into units called directorates based on regional
scope. There are at least five such directorates: 1) Iraq; 2) Lebanon, Palestine,
and Jordan; 3) Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India; 4) Turkey and Arabia; 5)
Central Asian former Soviet Republics, Europe, North America, and North
Africa.16 After receiving training, rookie Quds Force operatives are deployed
for several months on missions to Afghanistan and Iraq to gain field
experience.17 The Quds Force maintains close relationships with Iranian
client organizations like Hezbollah—active primarily in Lebanon—and Shia
groups in Iraq. Within the Quds Force, a secret group known as Department
9000 was responsible for providing training and support to Shia insurgents in
Iraq to combat U.S. forces during the U.S. occupation. 18
The Quds Force has been led by a man named Brigadier General Qassem
Suleimani since 1998. Suleimani has been described by one former CIA
officer as “‘the most powerful operative in the Middle East today.’”19
Suleimani is a powerful figure within the Iranian intelligence community, and
his influence has made the Quds Force an important stakeholder in
determining Iran’s foreign policy. At times, Suleimani has been personally
involved in shaping political developments in the regions, as demonstrated
when he negotiated a truce in 2008 between the Mahdi Army, the Shia
militia, and Iraqi government forces—although the Quds Force itself had been
propping up the Mahdi Army.20 Furthermore, Suleimani has often
communicated indirectly with senior U.S. officials, including General David
Petraeus, the commander of coalition forces, and Ryan Cocker, the U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq as a negotiating tactic in the Iran-U.S. proxy war in
Iraq.21 Evidently, Suleimani wields considerable autonomy in the deployment
of Quds Force operatives and in communicating with foreign officials, and the
influence of the Quds Force is closely tied to his political stature.

Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” New Yorker 89, no. 30 (September 30,
2013): 10.
16 Cordesman, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, p. 9.
17 Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” p. 10.
18 Mark Hosenball, “Tehran’s Secret ‘Department 9000,’” Newsweek, June 4, 2007.
19 Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” p. 2.
20 “Iran's ‘invisible man,’” Middle East no. 392 (August 2008): 28.
21 Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” pp. 1-23.
15
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Intelligence Operations and Capabilities
The IRGC’s intelligence activities include both domestic and foreign
operations. Domestic operations are focused on internal security issues and
eliminating dissent. These are primarily conducted by the Basij paramilitary
force and the IRGC Intelligence Organization’s cyber intelligence divisions.
Foreign operations are usually directed at the United States and its allies in
the Middle East, principally Israel and Saudi Arabia, or to preserve or expand
Iranian influence in the region. The IRGC supports and coordinates with
foreign client organizations that serve as proxies for Iranian interests,
principally through the Quds Force. The IRGC also has a history of
conducting targeted killings of individuals seen as particularly harmful to the
clerical regime. Underpinning all of these operations and capabilities are the
vast economic resources of the IRGC, which it generates through its
involvement in the Iranian public and private economy.

Internal Security
During the 2009 post-election protests, the IRGC led the crackdown on
opposition supporters, making arrests through the Basij paramilitary force.
The Security Directorate of the Basij was moved under the newly expanded
IRGC Intelligence Organization, and the head of Basij, Hassan Taeb, was
named head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization—Taeb was thus likely
personally leading the crackdown. The IRGC held political prisoners in Evin
prison in Tehran, in the “2A” ward operated by the IRGC. This ward was offlimits to regular prison guards, judiciary officials, and even MOIS officials. In
a sign of the open power struggle between the IRGC and the government
bureaucracy, the information ministry warned journalists that the IRGC had
taken control of security in the country and that their contacts at MOIS would
not be able to help locate or release them if arrested.22

Foreign Proxies
The IRGC has consistently supported foreign armed groups that further
Iranian interests in the Middle East and beyond. After the 1982 Israeli
invasion of Lebanon, the Quds Force played in integral role in the creation
and development of Hezbollah. Qassem Suleimani, now the head of the Quds
Force, has developed close ties with Hezbollah leaders and oversaw the
delivery of Iranian rockets to Hezbollah for use against Israel in the 2006

22

Champion, “Revolutionary Guard Tightens Security Grip.”
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war.23 Suleimani and the IRGC are also suspected of being involved in the
2005 assassination of Rafik Hariri, the former prime minister of Lebanon.24
The IRGC has also at times supported Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad in their operations in Palestine.25
During the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, the Quds Force supplied
Shia insurgent groups and, in some cases, even Sunni insurgents with training
and materiel to conduct a proxy war against the United States and its
coalition partners.26 In December 2006, U.S. forces captured the head of
operations for the Quds Force in Iraq, and a month later, another five Quds
Force operatives were captured carrying diplomatic passports.27 Over the
past few years, the IRGC has also been shipping arms to Shia Houthi rebels in
Yemen, including AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades.28 Iran has
increased its involvement in Yemen as Saudi Arabia has begun conducting
extensive air strikes, setting off a proxy war between the two regional rivals.
A similar rebellion with IRGC backing in Bahrain was put down through
Saudi intervention.29
The IRGC has also been highly active in supporting Bashar al-Assad’s regime
in Syria against Sunni-dominated rebels. Iran views the Assad regime in
Syria as a vital link to Hezbollah. In August 2012, Syrian rebels captured
forty-eight Iranian nationals, suspected by Western intelligence agencies to be
members of the Quds Force, within the country. Suleimani took personal
control over Iran’s involvement in Syria, coordinating efforts between the
Syrian military, Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia militias, and other IRGC commanders.
Quds Force members currently in Syria are estimated to be in the
thousands.30 Suleimani has invested a great deal of personal effort in
supporting the Assad government, and consequently, the IRGC is likely to
remain invested in that goal as well.

Neil MacFarquhar, “Odd Twist for Elite Unit Guiding Iran's Proxy Wars,” New York
Times, October 12, 2011, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/world/middleeast/new-plot-is-odd-twist-forirans-elite-quds-force.html?_r=0.
24 Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” p. 18.
25 “Iran's ‘invisible man,’” p. 31.
26 Hosenball, “Tehran’s Secret ‘Department 9000.’”
27 Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” p. 15.
28 Eric Schmitt and Robert F. Worth, “With Arms for Yemen Rebels, Iran Seeks Wider
Mideast Role,” New York Times, March 15, 2012, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/world/middleeast/aiding-yemen-rebels-iranseeks-wider-mideast-role.html?pagewanted=all.
29 MacFarquhar, “Odd Twist for Elite Unit Guiding Iran's Proxy Wars.”
30 Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” pp. 4-5.
23
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Targeted Attacks
Iran has a history of conducting targeted killings and mass bombings to
eliminate key opponents of the regime or to send a political message.
American and Argentine officials believe that the IRGC was involved in the
1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 bombing
of a Jewish Center in the same city, which combined to kill over 100 people.31
Other attacks linked to the IRGC include the bombing of the Khobar Towers
in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and the assassinations of Kurdish Iranian opposition
figures in the early 1990s. The IRGC’s Quds Force likely coordinated with
MOIS to carry out these attacks. Under the presidency of Mohammad
Khatami, beginning in 1997, such large scale attacks were abandoned to
prevent the increased international isolation of Iran. 32
While the IRGC has not carried out a major attack on a similar scale in recent
years, smaller operations have continued. The Quds Force attempted over
thirty attacks on foreign soil between 2011 and 2013, including in Thailand,
India, Nigeria, and Kenya. Most prominently, the IRGC attempted to
assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. A Quds Force agent
approached a Mexican drug cartel to detonate a bomb at a Washington, D.C.
restaurant where the Saudi ambassador would be eating. The plan was
immediately uncovered, however, as the cartel member approached was an
informant for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.33

Cyber Intelligence and Signals Intelligence
The IRGC has taken on a significant role in internet surveillance and
censorship in recent years. The Iranian government formed the Supreme
Council for Cyberspace in 2012 to consolidate oversight of the country’s
internet service providers. While Ahmadinejad was still president, he served
as the head of the council at the behest of Supreme Leader Khamenei. Thus,
the government wields significant statutory authority over the internet in
Iran. But the IRGC maintains powerful channels of influence. First and
foremost, the IRGC controls Iran’s leading internet service provider. The
internet sector was privatized in 2009, and the IRGC successfully bid for a
controlling stake of the Telecommunication Company of Iran, the country’s

Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” p. 10.
MacFarquhar, “Odd Twist for Elite Unit Guiding Iran's Proxy Wars.”
33 Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” p. 6.
31
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dominant service provider, through an affiliated shell corporation called the
Mobin Trust Consortium.34
The IRGC has also launched its own official website, Gerdab, which it uses to
track the activities of suspected dissenters and to post public denouncements
of them. Moreover, the IRGC also controls the Center for the Surveillance of
Organized Crime and the Working Group for Determining Criminal Content,
powerful groups with broad powers to censor and track internet users,
through the IRGC Intelligence Organization’s Cyber Defense Command.35 In
addition to its internal surveillance activities, there is evidence that the
IRGC’s cyber espionage extends outside Iran’s borders as well. According to
translations by an Israeli blog that covers Iranian military issues, the IRGC
posted on its Gerdab website in 2010 that it’s “‘cyber teams’ had hacked ‘29
websites affiliated with the U.S. espionage network.’”36
To date, Iran’s signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities are limited. As of
2006, Iran was operating two SIGINT stations in northern Syria and in the
Golan Heights in cooperation with the Syrian government, with two
additional SIGINT stations expected in northern Syria by 2007. These
SIGINT stations are funded and operated by the IRGC and are used mainly to
provide intelligence support to Hezbollah forces in Lebanon.37 The IRGC also
has the capability of flying reconnaissance aircraft to collect intelligence, but
this capacity is limited to minor missions using only a few purpose-built
aircraft. It is likely, however, that the IRGC monitors and tracks internet
activity to collect domestic signals intelligence through its control of
Telecommunication Company of Iran, the Center for the Surveillance of
Organized Crime, and the Working Group for Determining Criminal Content.

Economic control

Michael Slackman, “Elite Guard in Iran Tightens Grip with Media Move,” New York
Times, October 8, 2009.
35 Iran profile, “Special Edition: Surveillance,” Reporters Without Borders website,
available at: http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/iran/.
36 “IRGC on the web,” Iran Military News website, available at:
http://iranmilitarynews.org/irgc-on-the-web/.
37 Oliver Jones, Iran insights – Iran’s intelligence and security apparatus, Newcastle:
UK Defence Forum, 2011, available at:
http://www.ukdf.org.uk/assets/downloads/RS84CIraninsightsIran%E2%80%99sintelligenceandsecurityapparatusx.pdf.
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After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, Iran began to privatize its
economy under Khamenei and President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in an
effort to spur economic growth. Privatization has accelerated over the last
decade, with $120 billion of Iran’s public sector assets being sold off in that
period. However, according to the Principal Vice President, only 17 percent of
these assets are in the “true private sector,” while the rest of the assets have
been turned over to quasi-governmental organizations.38 These quasigovernmental organizations include the IRGC and various IRGC-linked
companies and associations, like the Mobin Trust Consortium which
purchased the aforementioned Telecommunication Company of Iran, one of
the largest publicly traded companies in Iran.
During this period of privatization, the IRGC has bought up controlling
interests in various major economic ventures, most with some sort of security
angle. Most of these purchases are conducted by nominally intermediate
financial institutions, like the IRGC and Basij Cooperative Foundations,
which are entirely controlled by the IRGC (and the Basij).39 The IRGC
controls pipelines, airports, illegal jetties, and a major bank. The IRGCowned construction company Khatami Al Anbia regularly receives massive
contracts for infrastructure projects, including $342 million in 2007 to
develop the Chah Bahar seaport and $850 million in 2010 for several no-bid
contracts in oil and natural gas development.40
But the increased economic activity of the IRGC has been publicly criticized in
some sectors of Iran. The vast network of IRGC-linked companies has led to
significant embezzlement. In 2009, the government blocked the purchase of
a mine by an IRGC-linked company because the purchase price was far lower
than the market value. Other IRGC and military leaders have been publicly
chastised for corruption, and in 2013, a prominent businessman with close
ties to the IRGC leadership was arrested in Turkey on corruption charges.
Current President Hassan Rouhani has opposed greater economic
involvement from the IRGC, cancelling several government contracts with the
IRGC and associated firms in response to accusations of corruption.41 In
2013, Khamenei himself told the leaders of the IRGC “that protecting the
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revolution does not mean protecting the economic and political domains,
hence expressing his displeasure with the IRGC’s involvement in both politics
and the economy.”42
The IRGC’s involvement in Iran’s private sector economy has also made it
vulnerable to international economic sanctions. Western intelligence
agencies have become acutely aware of the IRGC’s economic entrenchment,
and they have attempted to use this to their advantage when devising
sanctions. IRGC officers involved in the black market may actually be
benefitting from the sanctions, as it drives a greater share of economic activity
into their domain. But these IRGC officers are low- or mid-level officials with
little political clout. High-level leaders of the IRGC have economic interests in
larger companies that are negatively impacted by the sanctions.43

Conclusion
Over the past decade, the IRGC has become the dominant intelligence
organization within Iran, and arguably the dominant political organization as
well. This is the result of several factors: a coordinated effort along with
Khamenei to purge and weaken MOIS while consolidating power; the
reputation and influence of individual IRGC leaders like Suleimani; and the
gradual entrenchment of the IRGC in Iran’s economy. Significant challenges
to the IRGC’s current position remain, however. Internal dissent remains the
IRGC’s greatest threat, and the danger of a Green Revolution coming to pass
in full is ever-present. The IRGC was able to mobilize the Basij to disrupt the
movement in 2009, but as social media and other potentially sociallydisruptive technologies continue to evolve and as international economic
sanctions continue to take their toll, it may be more difficult to contain it the
next time. Economic sanctions are also hurting the economic interests of the
IRGC itself, as the top leaders have a great deal of economic exposure through
investments in large companies being targeted. Moreover, if the IRGC’s
participation in the Iranian economy continues to grow, it may contribute to
more public resentment of corruption, eroding the legitimacy of the IRGC.
The stated mission of the IRGC is to defend the doctrine of the 1979
revolution. In theory, this is a vague enough mandate that could be
interpreted in many different ways. But in practice, this translates to the
preservation of the Iranian clerical regime, led by the Guardian Council and
the Supreme Leader. Consequently, the fate of the IRGC is linked with the
42
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fate of the Iranian theocracy. The two forces have formed a symbiotic
relationship that keeps the current system in place. But if that system is
threatened, the IRGC’s leadership will have to adapt to a rapidly evolving
environment to preserve its position of dominance. The IRGC has to-date
supported the government’s nuclear talks with the United States and other
world powers, with Qassem Suleimani even defending the chief negotiator
and foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif against hardliners in the Iranian
parliament.44 Should Iran reach a deal with the United States and thereafter
establish more normal relations, the political, social, and economic
landscapes in which the IRGC operates are likely to change significantly. In
such circumstances, the pragmatic voices in the IRGC may choose to
reexamine the organization’s role in and relationship with the political
sphere.
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